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SUMMARY CREDITOR REMEDIES:
GOING... GOING ... GONE?
"For instance, now, (the Queen states to Alice) . . . there's the
King's Messenger. He's in prison now, being punished; and the trial
doesn't even begin til next Wednesday; and of course the crime
comes last of all." Alice replies: "Suppose he never commits the
crime?" "That would be all the better, wouldn't it?" the Queen
responds.'
Traditionally, the concept of "fair play and substantial justice"
has been proclaimed the hallmark of procedural due process. 2 Ele-
mentary to such a concept is the basic postulate that one with an
interest to protect be given notice of any claims against that inter-
est and an opportunity to be heard in the matter.3 A logical infer-
ence one may draw from all of this is that to be truly effective,
"notice and hearing" would best serve the tenets of due process
when they occur prior to one's being deprived of his property, and
not after the deprivation has occurred. Surprisingly, such has not
traditionally been the case for a class of the general public most
commonly referred to as "debtors." 4 As to this class of persons, the
time and nature of notice and hearings have been allowed to fluc-
1. L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLAss, (Modern Library Edition)
226-227 (1872).
2. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
3. Id.
4. Comment, The Constitutional Validity of Attachment In Light of
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 17 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 837 (1970).
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tuate from judicial hearings prior to seizure to administrative hear-
ings sometime after seizure.5 The reason for this state of affairs
appears to be the existence of the statutory device of the pre-
judgment remedy.
Prejudgment remedies are summary in nature. They are exe-
cuted with rapidity and performed without ceremony or formality.
By their very nature, opportunity to assert defenses comes after,
not before the fact.
For some 600 years, the summary creditor remedy has been
firmly implanted in both the common law and statutes.6 Yet since
1969 summary remedy statutes throughout the nation have come
under the careful scrutiny of the courts. The result appears to be
an unprecedented number of overturned statutes which have not
met the "prior notice and hearing test." California alone has seen
the courts strike down prejudgment statutes concerning garnish-
ment,7 attachment," unlawful detainer,9 claim and delivery,10 and
the repossession and disposition of collateral. 1
This article will focus upon the documentation of the major de-
cisions in this area of the law within the past three years. It is
hoped that this article will set these decisions in an historic per-
spective, examine the most recent cases and their implications, and
predict the outcome of those cases and issues not yet resolved. Al-
though the concern of the documentary will be with the national
trend, close attention will be given to the developments in Cali-
fornia law and possible changes in summary creditor remedies cur-
rently underway in the California legislature.
L'mvAK: SNIADACH, JUN 9, 1969-AN ASSAULT ON HISTORY
On June 9, 1969, the United States Supreme Court held that Wis-
5. Id.
6. See 3 HoLDswoRTH, A HI-STORY OF ENGLISH LAW 282-285 (1927) and
2 F. PoLLocK & F. MArIAN, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 557 (1909).
7. McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666
(1970).
8. Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr.
709 (1971).
9. Mihans v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17
(1970).
10. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
11. Adams v. Egley's Recovery Service, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal.
1972).
consin's prejudgment wage garnishment procedure violated the
fundamental principles of due process since it authorized the seiz-
ure of wages without prior notice or an opportunity for a hearing.
12
The Wisconsin statute involved 8 had provided that the clerk of
court issue a summons at the request of a creditor's lawyer. By
serving the employer-garnishee, the lawyer could secure the "freez-
ing" of one half of the wages due an employee-debtor. Subsequent
to this action, the creditor had ten days in which to also serve the
summons and complaint upon the debtor himself. The wages
could be unfrozen when and if the debtor challenged the garnish-
ment in court and won on the merits.
In the relatively short majority opinion of five pages, the pri-
mary question considered was whether there had been a taking
of property without due process. Justice Douglas, author of the
opinion, appears to have focused upon the issue within a socio-
economic context; emphasizing the type of debt and property in-
volved. After noting that "because a procedure would pass muster
under a feudal regime does not mean it gives necessary protection
to all property in its modern forms,"'1 4 the court went on to deal
specifically with wages-noting the grave hardships and economic
leverage a creditor could exercise over a wage earner.'5 By recog-
nizing the significant advantage our economic system allows a cred-
itor, the court drew what appears to have been a sharp distinction
between legal philosophy and economic reality.'
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan carried the majority
opinion one step further by applying a stricter due process for-
mula.17 He rested his decision on what he termed the Anglo-Amer-
ican theory that property should not be taken prior to a hearing-
even if the property might later be returned. After all, it was the
"use" of the property which had been seized.
Although Sniadach's language was couched in terms of the "spe-
cial quality of wages," hardly had its ink dried before the battle
began over whether its rationale and principles should be applied
to a variety of statutory prejudgment replevin cases already be-
fore the courts of several states.
A Question of Intent: The Narrow View
It has been pointed out that the Sniadach court's "favorable" ci-
12. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
13. R.S. 1858, c. 130, § 53 (1858), as amended Wis. STAT. § 367.18 (1969).
14. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S., at 340 (1969).
15. Id. at 341.
16. Id. at 339.
17. Id. at 342 (concurring opinion).
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tation to the 1928 McInnes decision' 8 contains a forceful rejection
of the view that attaching property constitutes an unconstitutional
deprivation of property interests.19 The Supreme Court in Mc-
Innes merely affirmed per curiam a Maine decision 20 which saw
that state's highest court uphold Maine's attachment procedure.
The Maine statutes had been challenged on the ground that the
creditor need not post a bond prior to the attachment. One might
note, though, that unlike McInnes, the Sniadach challenge was put
specifically to the issue of receiving prior notice and hearing. The
value of attachment itself was not the crux of the Sniadach case, as
it was in McInnes. Thus Sniadach challenged the procedural due
process while McInnes challenged the substantive due process of
attachment itself.21 Although the latter might be satisfied by a
given remedy, the former may not be.
Some eight months after the Sniadach decision, on March 20,
1970, one of the first chances to interpret that case arose in Bruns-
wick Corporation v. J and P, Inc.22 which involved the repossession
and resale of bowling equipment. The repossession had occurred
pursuant to the terms of a conditional sales contract, and in con-
formance with the Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code.
23
In its decision, the Brunswick court gave no merit to the tenets
enunciated in Sniadach, distinguishing that case on the basis that
it was a "unique case involving 'a specialized type of property pre-
senting distinct problems in our economic system.' "24 Brunswick,
reasoned the court, involved not wages, but a security interest.
Clarification and a Broader View
Three days after Brunswick was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court
in Goldberg v. Kelly25 considered the question of cutting off wel-
fare aid prior to a hearing. Appellees in that case, residents of
18. McKay v. McInnes, 279 U.S. 820 (1928); cited at 395 U.S. 340.
19. Comment, Laprease and Fuentes: Replevin Reconsidered, 71 CoLm.
L. REv. 886, 897 (1971).
20. McKay v. McLnnes, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd, 279 U.S.
820 (1928).
21. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S., at 340 (1969).
22. Brunswick Corporation v. J & P, Inc., 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970).
23. 12 A. O.S. 1961, §§ 1-101 et seq., 9-207(3), 9-504(3), 9-507, 9-507(1).
24. Brunswick Corp. v. J & P Inc., 424 F.2d at 105 (10th Cir. 1970).
25. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
New York, had been receiving federally financed aid to families
with dependent children. When the aid was terminated without a
prior hearing, the former recipients challenged the procedure as
having denied them due process as guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment.
26
The formula applied by the Goldberg Court was a test of bal-
ancing the extent to which due process varies in application-de-
pending upon whether the individual's interest in avoiding loss is
outweighed by the interest of the government in a summary adju-
dication.2 7  Once again in a concurring opinion28 Justice Harlan
was to stress the fundamental requisite of due process as the op-
portunity to be heard. This opportunity, he reasoned, must be
tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be
heard.29 Written submissions would not be satisfactory 3°-the re-
cipient of aid must be allowed to state his position orally.
Four months later, in Laprease v. Raymour's Furniture Co.,3 1
another New York welfare recipient asked a three-judge federal
district court to declare unconstitutional Article 71 of the New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules. That article had authorized
repossession of articles purchased under conditional sales contracts
when a purchaser defaulted in payments.32  Mrs. Laprease had
purchased a bed, mattress, a high chair, and other household
26. The local law of the City of New York had provided at least a 7-day
prior notice to a recipient whose welfare funds were to be cut. The re-
cipient could then ask for a review of the proposed cut by a superior of the
supervisor who approved the discontinuance. The recipient could then
submit a written statement as to why payments should not be discon-
tinued. See Subdivision (b) of § 351.26 of New York Regulations as
amended.
27. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S., at 263 (1970).
28. Id. at 267.
29. Id. at 269.
30. Id.
31. 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970).
32. In New York, the replevin of a chattel could be effected only as part
of a larger action to try the right to possession of the chattel. The main
suit was to be commenced before or at the time the plaintiff delivered an
affidavit or undertaking to the sheriff. In his affidavit the plaintiff had to
establish the identity and value of the property since he had to post
twice its value. The sheriff was then authorized to seize the chattel with-
out delay and keep it for three days before delivering it to the creditor-
plaintiff-unless the defendant reclaimed the chattel by posting a re-
claiming bond equal to that posted by the plaintiff. If the defendant did
post the bond, the sheriff once again held the property for three days,
after which time the defendant-debtor would regain possession and the
main action would proceed to a final judgment. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. § 7101-
7108 (McKinney 1963); See also Comment, Professional Remedies In New
York Reappraised Under Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.: A Constitution-
al Fly In The Creditor's Ointment, 34 ALBAN Y L. R- v. 426, 447 n.147 (1970).
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goods from Raymour's Furniture Company under a conditional
sales contract. Due to an illness and subsequent loss of salary,
Mrs. Laprease could not continue her payments. 33 Fearing that the
goods might be repossessed, she brought suit to stay seizure pend-
ing a court hearing on the matter.
Mrs. Laprease offered three bases of challenge to the New York
laws: due process denial, fourth amendment and denial of equal
protection.34 Only the former two were considered by the court,
which concluded that
the lack of refrigeration, cooking facilities and beds create hard-
ships, it would seem, equally as severe as the temporary with-
holding of half of Sniadach's pay.35
Hence, it was held that procedural due process requires that notice
and hearing occur before an alleged debtor's property is seized.
As such, Article 71 of the New York CPLR was found deficient. 3
One might note that the Laprease court utilized two rationales
to support its decision. First, it applied the balancing test of Gold-
berg,37 where it found that the government interest in summary
repossession did not outweigh that of Mrs. Laprease. Secondly,
the Laprease court avoided having to come to grips with an inter-
pretation of just what scope Sniadach's "specialized type of prop-
erty" concept of wages should be given. This was quite simply
accomplished by categorizing Mrs. Laprease's furniture as "spe-
cialized property."38  Although this puddle-jumping did accom-
plish its immediate goal, it introduced a problem for future adju-
dication: exactly what type of goods should be considered "spe-
cialized types of property," and thus protected property?3
After applying the tenets of due process' opportunity to be heard
to both wage garnishment and welfare, the next significant appli-
cation of the pronounced doctrines by the U.S. Supreme Court ap-
pears to have been in the area of access to the courts. As articu-
33. 71 CoLum. L. REV. 886, supra note 19, at 890; See also text and com-
ments accompanying no.22 supra.
34. Bases of consumer actions are discussed at p. 303 infra.
35. 315 F. Supp. at 723.
36. Id. at 724.
37. See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
38. 315 F. Supp. at 722.
39. This specific problem will be discussed more fully at p. 316 infra.
lated by the Court in Boddie v. Connecticut,40 due process requires
that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he
is deprived of any significant property interst.
41
By 1971, it is clear that a growing trend was developing as an
outgrowth of the 1969 Sniadach decision. It was a trend toward
reading Sniadach'ls language broadly enough to encompass pre-
judgment replevin statutes. Although the U.S. Supreme Court had
not yet specifically considered the validity of the summary creditor
remedies, the beginning of such a battle was already underway in
the lower federal and state courts.
CAIFoRNLI DEVELOPMENTS
Although California's prejudgment wage garnishment statutes
were declared unconstitutional in 1970,42 it was during the sum-
mer months of 1971 that the California Supreme Court launched
a concerted judicial attack on summary creditor remedies. Cali-
fornia's claim and delivery statutes4 were challenged in Blair v.
Pitchess,4 4 and its prejudgment attachment procedures 45 were chal-,
lenged in Randone v. Appellate Department.40 In both cases, the
statutory provisions were declared unconstitutional violations of
the tenets of procedural due process.
Claim and Delivery Attacked
Prior to the Blair decision, the California statutes had provided
that at the time a summons was issued or before the answer in an
action to recover possession of personal property, a plaintiff could
require the local sheriff to seize the property from the defend-
ant.47  This procedure was initiated when the plaintiff filed an
affidavit together with an undertaking of at least two sureties for
40. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); The statutes involved can
be found at CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 252-261 (1968). These statutes pro-
vided that in order to file for a divorce, the clerk of court must be paid $45.
They were challenged as violating due process since the inability to pay
may prevent access to the courts to indigents who in good faith have
sought a judicial dissolution of their marriage.
41. 401 U.S. at 378.
42. McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr.
666 (1970).
43. CAL. CODE Civ. PRo. §§ 509-521 (West 1954).
44. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42.
45. CAL. CODE Civ. PRo. § 537.1 (West 1954).
46. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709.
47. CAL. CODE CIr. PRo. §§ 509, 511 (West 1954); See also Ordin, Sum-
mary Creditor Remedies: A Thing of the Past?, 47 L.A. BAR BuLL. at 230
(1972).
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twice the value of the property.48 The sheriff was thereby au-
thorized to take the property, even if the taking had to be force-
ful,49 and to accomplish this, he could "call to his aid the power
of his county." 50
California's claim and delivery statutes, which were established
in 1851,51 were attacked by the Blair court on three separate
grounds5 2-that they violated (1) the fourth and fourteenth amend-
ment provisions againsf unlawful searches and seizures (2) the due
process requirements of the fifth and fourteenth amendments, and
that they also violated the corresponding California Constitution
provisions.5
3
In order to hold that Civil Code § 517 constituted unreasonable
searches and seizures in the absence of probable cause, the court
had first to hurdle the problem of applying a criminal law concept
to a civil action. To do this, the court relied on Camara v. Mu-
nicipal Court 54 and See v. City of Seattle.55 In both of these deci-
sions, the U.S. Supreme Court had held that the fourth amendment
protections are not to be limited solely to criminal cases.
The second problem facing the court was the concept of waiver.
The defendant-creditor in Blair had argued that Blair had per-
sonally and contractually consented to the search and resulting
seizure by waiving his fourth amendment rights. Once again bor-
rowing principles firmly established in the criminal field, the court
held that an acquiescence to a claim of legal authority is not a vol-
untary waiver-the acquiescence occurring after the officer had
identified himself and had shown and explained the meaning of
the claim and delivery process to those present.56 Thus,
In claim and delivery cases the occupant of the premises is con-
fronted not only by the intimidating presence of an officer of the
law, but also by the existence of legal process which appears to
justify the intrusion. In such a situation acquiescence to the intru-
48. CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. §§ 510, 512 (West 1954).
49. CAL. CODE Civ. PRO. § 517 (West 1954). This section permitted the
sheriff, after demanding delivery, to cause the building "to be broken open."
50. Id.
51. Stats. 1851, c.5, p.65, § 100.
52. 5 Cal. 3d at 285, 486 P.2d at 1261, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
53. CAL. CoNST. art. I, §§ 13 and 19.
54. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
55. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
56. 5 Cal. 3d at 274, 486 P.2d at 1253, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
sion cannot operate as a voluntary waiver of Fourth Amendment
rights.57
The court found that contractual provisions purporting to give the
seller the right to retake the property on default of payment are,
in essence, provisions of adhesion contracts, the terms of which are
dictated by the seller.58 Further, the court reasoned that even if
the consent had been valid, it was consent personal to the seller,
and could not be assigned to an officer of the law. 9
In the area of due process, the Blair court relied heavily on Snia-
dach6 0 to establish that California's claim and delivery procedures
violated the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The principles
enunciated in Sniadach had been violated, since there was a taking,
the taking had occurred prior to a hearing and in the absence of
weighty state or creditor interests. Further, the California statu-
tory scheme was not drawn narrowly enough to encompass only
extraordinary circumstances. 61 With this, the California court was
making it very clear that it would give Sniadach a broad view.
0 2
Besides the Sniadach decision, the Blair court was also guided by
the Boddie63 case and its articulation of the requisites of due proc-
ess. 64
Although the Blair court could find no way through which the
claim and delivery law could be saved by judicial interpretation,
the court expressed the hope that the legislature might enact new
prejudgment replevin remedies "in conformity with the constitu-
tional principles discussed (in the Blair case) ."o
Prejudgment Attachment: A Corollary And Beyond
With Randone6 6 came the decision that California's attachment
provisions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 537 violated due
process requirements. Subsequent to the Sniadach decision, the
court had held it unconstitutional to attach wages in California
57. Id. at 275, 486 P.2d at 1254, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 54 (1971).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
61. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d at 277, 486 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at
55 (1971).
62. Id.
63. See discussion accompanying n.40 supra.
64. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d at n.10, 486 P.2d at n.10, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at n.10.
65. 5 Cal. 3d at 284, 486 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
66. Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr.
709 (1971).
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under Section 537.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.67 But the court
had declined to pass on the constitutionality of Section 537 in its
entirety, 8 choosing instead to await a case involving a creditor-
debtor relationship. Randone afforded the opportunity. There,
the court had before it a debtor whose creditor had attached prop-
erty other than wages.
The Randone court rejected the creditor argument that Sniadach
be limited to prejudgment wage garnishment, emphasizing that
Sniadach could not be so limited since it was not simply a new
rule being applied to wage garnishments, but was rather an ex-
pression of "the mainstream of the past procedural due process de-
cisions of the United States Supreme Court." 69
Although Randone relied upon Sniadach, Boddie and its recent
ruling in Blair, the strength and weakness of the decision rested
with its reliance upon the balancing test expressed in the Goldberg
case. The test was based on the analysis that the extent to which
due process must be afforded will vary with the individual's inter-
est in avoiding grievous loss balanced against the urgency of gov-
ernmental interest in a summary adjudication. The Randone court
held that the hardships imposed on a debtor by the attachment of
his "necessities of life" 70 is so severe that it is never sufficient to
allow such a deprivation before notice and hearing on the actual
validity of a creditor's claim.
7'1
The strength of Randone rests in the fact that it extended the ef-
fect of the procedural due process requirements of Blair by requir-
ing a hearing on the validity of the claim.
72
Randone's weakness lies, ironically, in its strength. For al-
though it excluded all "necessities" from prejudgment seizure, it
did not define what procedure should be used in determining ex-
emption. Although Randone defined "necessities" as those items
67. McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal. 3d 903, 464 P.2d 122, 83 Cal. Rptr. 666
(1970). See also Cline v. Credit Bureau of Santa Clara County, 1 Cal. 3d
908 (1970).
68. People ex rel. Lynch v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 910, 464 P.2d 126,
83 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1970).
69. 5 Cal. 3d at 550, 488 P.2d at 22, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
70. The "necessity" in Randone was a checking account which had
been attached.
71. 5 Cal. 3d at 558, 488 P.2d at 27, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
72. Id. at 558, 488 P.2d at 28, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 724.
which are "essential for day-to-day living" and "which would im-
pose tremendous hardships" and force a debtor to settle a claim
without judicial recourse and thus deprive the debtor of a "mean-
ingful opportunity to be heard on the merits, 78 the court did not
evaluate whether the existing exemption provisions were adequate
to define "necessities.
'7 4
Although the court had -deferred to the legislature in coming up
with an acceptable attachment method within its judicial princi-
ples,7 5 the California courts handed their legislature and future
state courts the overwhelming problems of legislative delegation
and possibly widely divergent definitions of "necessities."
REMAING ExcEPTIoNs
It might be best at this point to note that beginning with the
Sniadach decision, the trend has left exceptions to the rule that
summary creditor actions without notice or hearing deny proce-
dural due process. But it is clear that to withstand the test of con-
stitutionality, statutes implementing these exceptions must be nar-
rowly drawn to include only "extraordinary circumstances.170 Fur-
ther, such summary deprivations appear to have several factors in
common. First, the seizures seem to benefit the public rather than
a private individual; second, the nature of the risk involved re-
quires immediate action; and third, the property taken does not
vitally affect another's livelihood. Thus the Sniadach court sanc-
tioned the prejudgment remedy permitting specialized government
officers to react immediately to serious financial difficulties of a
banking institution by seizing operational control of the bank's
assetsY 7 and permitting the immediate seizure of misbranded drugs
on the market.78
One other case cited by Sniadach, Ownbey v. Morgan,7 9 found
73. Id. at 561, 448 P.2d at 30, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
74. The provisions of CAL. CODE Civ. PRo. §§ 620 et seq. encompass a
wide variety of items ranging from "necessary household furnishings" to
a church pew.
75. The Randone court pointed out that "a constitutionally valid pre-
judgment statute, which exempts necessities from its operation, can be
drafted by the legislature" to permit attachment of property after notice
and hearing. See Randone v. Appellate Dep't., 5 Cal. 3d at 563, 448 P.2d
at 31, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 727 (1971).
76. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 339 (1969). See also
discussion in Randone v. Appellate Dep't., 5 Cal. 3d at 553, 488 P.2d
at 24, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 720 (1971).
77. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Coffin Brothers v. Bennett,
277 U.S. 29 (1928).
78. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
79. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
[voL. 10: 292, 1973] Law Note
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
constitutional a statute permitting prejudgment attachment of a
nonresident's property by a resident creditor. Although the "pub-
lic interest" in Ownbey was not as strong as those cases thus con-
sidered, the quasi-in-rem attachment of Ownbey, in conformance
with the prevailing theories of jurisdictional authority, was fre-
quently the only basis by which a state could afford its own citi-
zens an effective remedy for injuries inflicted by nonresidents. 80
BASES UPON WICH PLAINTIFF-DEBTOR ARGUMENTS HAVE RESTED
Due Process
Where the taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs no ex-
tended argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior hear-
ing... this prejudgment ... procedure violates the fundamental
principles of due process.8 1
Applying the procedural requirements of due process, i.e. notice
and an opportunity to be heard prior to a taking of property, due
process was an argument readily available to the courts following
Sniadach. It was applied in Laprease where the court announced
that procedural due process requires that notice and hearing be
provided prior to seizing a debtor's property, or at least that the
creditor present to a judicial officer the circumstances allegedly
justifying summary action.8 2 One might also note that the due
process argument appears to have served at least a partial basis
in all of those cases considered thus far.8 3 The reasons may be
two-fold. First, Due Process was firmly established as an accepted
basis of challenge to summary remedies with the Sniadach deci-
sion. Secondly, the procedural due process argument is itself not
a complicated one to apply-the two requirements being prior no-
tice and hearing.
The Fourth Amendment
The taking of goods by an officer of the law appears to fall
within the borderline between the region of governmental searches
80. Randone v. Appellate Dep't., 5 Cal. 3d at 554, 488 P.2d at 25,
96 Cal. Rptr. at 721.
81. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 342 (1969) (footnote
omitted).
82. 315 F. Supp. 724.
83. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.
3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971); Randone v. Appellate
Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971).
and seizures, and the constitutionally regulated area of private
searches and seizures.8 4 More specifically, a summary action in-
volves a warrantless search and seizure by an officer of the law
at the request of a private party, for use in a private action.8"
Even prior to the Blair decision,86 which utilized a fourth amend-
ment basis, the Laprease court had grappled with the problem of
applying what had traditionally been a criminal law concept to a
civil action. By applying the expanding doctrines of Camara and
See, 7 the Laprease court had found that
If the Sheriff cannot invade the privacy of a home without a
warrant when the state interest is to prevent a crime, he should not
be able to do so to retrieve a stove or refrigerator about which the
right to possession is disputed. 88
The problems in applying the fourth amendment base rest with
the fact that most summary remedies are statutory remedies.
Had the summary remedies, such as replevin, remained common
law remedies, the problem might have been easier89 for at common
law, an officer of the law might not enter a building without the
consent of the owner for the purpose of serving a civil suit or proc-
ess.90 However, most states with summary remedy statutes similar
to replevin either expressly or by statutory interpretation have
conferred upon the sheriff the authority to make a forceful entry. 1
Those courts which have refused to accept a fourth amendment
base appear to have done so primarily upon the rationale that the
civil, contractual nature of installment credit transactions con-
trols.92 Although the presence of an officer of the law implies the
existence of behavior to which the fourth amendment restrictions
generally attach, it has been pointed out that in the area of condi-
tional sales contracts, all states permit a seller to independently
retake the chattel if it can be done peacefully. 93  As such, it has
84. Comment, supra note 19, at 898.
85. Id.
86. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
87. See text accompanying notes 54 and 55 supra.
88. Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 722 (N.D.N.Y.
1970).
89. Comment, supra note 19, at 900.
90. Id.; See also United States v. ONE ARTicLE oF DEVIcE LABELED
SP~cTocnRomIm, 66 F. Supp. 754, 757 n.3 (D. Ore. 1946).
91. Comment, supra note 19, at 900; See also N.Y. CIV. PRAc. § 7110
(McKinney 1963) and FLA. STAT. Aw. § 78.10 (Supp. 1970) for statutes
expressly permitting forcible entry by a sheriff; State v. Pope, 4 Wash. 2d
394, 400, 103 P.2d 1089, 1091-2 (1940) for an example of statutory interpre-
tation.
92. E.g., Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954, 958 (S.D. Fla. 1970) rev'd
sub nom. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). This case will be more
fully discussed infra at p. 309.
93. Comment, supra note 19, at 901.
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been argued that the presence of an officer of the law for the ex-
press purpose of minimizing violent confrontations should not log-




It is with the equal protection argument that the courts have
had the most trouble in attempting to invalidate summary remedy
statutes.99 The argument advanced by proponents of the equal
protection base rests upon two rationales which focus in on the
redelivery process, 96 i.e. the means by which a debtor might re-
claim the goods prior to a judgment on the merits. The primary
objection appears to be that the amount which a debtor must post
is set by the creditor at the time of the taking 7 As a result, the
knowledge that a debtor might seek to reclaim the goods could
convince a creditor to post a higher bond. A second argument is
that discrimination on the basis of economic status results in a sit-
uation where a creditor may be able to post a bond and the debtor
may be financially unable to.
98
The chief problem in setting forth an equal protection argument
appears to be that, as with searches and seizures, the equal protec-
tion clause has had no historical applicability in the ordinary civil
case.0 9 The direct question involved is whether unequal treatment
resulting from an unequal economic condition is constitutionally
prohibited.
Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in the Boddie decision may
have clarified the problem somewhat by stating that
. . . the reach of the Equal Protection Clause is not definable with
mathematical precision. But in spite of doubts by some, as it has
been construed, rather definite guidelines have been devel-
oped .... Here, the invidious discrimination is based on one of the
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. By way of example see: N.Y. CXV. PRAC. § 7103(a) (McKinney
1963).
97. WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE § 7102.17
(1970).
98. Tamburro v. Trama, 59 Misc. 2d 488, 299 N.Y.S.2d 528 (Westchester
County Court 1969).
99. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 286 F. Supp. 968, 973 (D. Conn.
1968), rev'd, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
guidelines: poverty. 00
In spite of this statement, Justice Douglas still viewed an equal pro-
tection argument as the narrower route to follow. A second con-
curring opinion by Justice Brennan saw the matter as a combina-
tion of due process and equal protection.101 Thus, although the
subject has been dealt with as a side issue, the U.S. Supreme Court
appears to have refused a direct confrontation with equal protec-
tion implications where the subject is couched in terms of the un-
equal distribution of income within our economic society.
10 2
THE OPPosrIoN: CREDIToR ARGUMENTS
Although several major arguments have been postulated on the
creditors' behalf, none appear to have faired well under judicial
scrutiny.
Credit Will Be Harder To Obtain
A primary argument posed by creditors has been that eliminating
the summary remedies will necessarily make credit more difficult
to obtain.103 In Randone it was contended that the availability of
a general summary attachment procedure does serve a greater pur-
pose than aiding a creditor in collecting his debts. It was urged
that without a generally available summary remedy creditors
would find it more difficult and thus more expensive to collect
their debts. As a result, they would be obligated to raise credit
rates and terminate the extension of credit to high-risk individuals,
thus working as a detriment to the public's interest in liberalized
credit.
As was pointed out by the Randone court, "there is no reason to
believe that attachment has any necessary effect on the availability
of credit."'1 4 Available credit can be restricted, stated the court,
100. Id. at 385 (Douglas, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 388 (Brennan, J., concurring).
102. See also: Sanks v. Georgia, 401 U.S. 144 (1971), where a state
law requiring a tenant to post a bond before filing a defense to a dis-
possessory warrant and pay double rent in the case of an adverse judg-
ment was challenged. On reargument, the U.S. Supreme Court refused
to consider the constitutional claims in light of "intervening factors".
103. Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d, at 555, 488 P.2d, at 25, 96
Cal. Rptr., at 721 (1971).
104. Brunn, Wage Garnishment In California: A Study and Recommen-
dations, 53 CALi. L. Rsv. 1214, 1249 (1965). Data collected by Mr. Brunn
revealed that although creditors contended that consumer credit would drop
if wage garnishment was not continued in California, there appeared to
be no empirical support for this contention. Creditors had argued that
credit was harder to obtain in New York (where a creditor could garnish
10% of a debtor's wages) than in California (where a creditor could gar-
nish 50%). However, empirical data from collection agencies and other
sources revealed that credit is as easily available in New York as Cal-
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only if a creditor grants or denies, say, a loan, on the basis of the
availability of attachment. 10 5 In the average debt case, the collect-
ibility depends not upon the attachment, but upon execution levies
which make a debt fast and easy to collect,106 and which are facili-
tated by the frequency of default judgments.
107
Accepting arguendo the creditor argument that credit might be
harder to obtain, a counterargument might be that in the long run
such a result may prove beneficial to the public's interest by ul-
timately preventing the extention of credit to those who are unable
to repay their debts.
The days of debt as something "faintly immoral" are long past.
With the post World War II era of consumer spending emerged
what has been called "the American way of debt."'1 8 Debt, which
was not long ago discouraged is now very much a way of life-it is,
in fact, encouraged--encouraged through liberal department store
credit plans which solicit the potential customer by mail, and
television ads emphasizing "easy terms" and a "fly now-pay later"
philosophy.
Hand-in-hand with the expansion of debt have come even more
complex changes in American buying characteristics. While credit
saw its origins in the temporary extension of credit by the neigh-
borhood market, consumer debt today is characterized by large,
impersonal institutions (ever try tangling with Bank of America's
computers?), complicated contract terms which may be incoherent
to the average buyer, and high interest rates. These factors be-
come important in light of reports that in a vast number of cases,
the debt is a fraudulent one, trapping the poor and ignorant in an
"easy credit nightmare."'10 9
ifornia; with $6.621 billion of installment credit extended in California and
$6.124 billion in New York. Likewise, the study covered 5 other states,
3 of which exempted the entire family income from garnishment and 2 of
which made garnishment freely available. The ratio of installment credit
to retail sales varied very little between them.
105. Comment, supra note 4, at 846.
106. Id.
107. Id. at n.63; Brunn, supra note 104, at 1221.
108. Brunn, supra note 104, at 1243. In 1945 outstanding consumer credit
totaled 5.7 billion dollars; in 1960, 56 billion dollars; in 1964, 76.8 billion
dollars; in 1969, 116.597 billion dollars (these figures do not reflect mort-
gage indebtedness) see 55 Fn. REsERVE BULL., at A54 (1969).
109. 114 CoNG. P~c. 1832 (1970) (remarks of Congressman Sullivan,
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs).
Granted that there is a great public interest in promoting easy
credit, a resulting expansion of the economy, and thus a higher
standard of living. But material comforts may come at too high
a cost if collection devices may be employed which ultimately dis-
count the very essence of consumer credit-the ability to repay.
As enunciated by the California Assembly:
It is a time-honored principle that consumer credit should be ex-
tended to those who are entitled to it on the basis of their sta-
bility, ability to pay, willingness to pay and according to their sta-
tion in life as related to the articles purchased, but should be re-
fused to those who do not qualify.110
Although such words may seem harsh, they take on a more plaus-
ible air in light of a Congressional report that one of the primary
problems in the installment contract field is the detrimental effect
on business stability caused by the extension of credit to buyers
unable to live up to their obligations coupled with the inability
of debtors to understand the complex terms of their agreements.1
The availability of summary remedies (coupled with the liberal
extension of credit) may in many cases actually encourage both
an unwise extension of credit by sellers, and an unwise use of credit
by debtors.112
A creditor, especially a fraudulent one,1" 3 could thus find him-
self armed with the tools of an adhesion contract coupled with rel-
atively inexpensive collection remedies. This combining of ele-
ments may place a defaulting buyer at the mercy of a dishonest
creditor. 1 4  Ultimately, the result is the extension of credit to
those whom creditors can reasonably expect will not be able to
meet future payments." 5 Logically, this result could then be-
110. Final Report of Subcommittee on Lending and Fiscal Agencies, Ap-
pendix to the Journal of the Assembly, Vol. 15, No. 22 (1959). This re-
port consisted of testimony precedent to the passage of California's Unrub
Act regulating consumer credit in installment contracts. It was hoped that
the Act, by requiring interest rate disclosure and setting interest limita-
tions, would result in a more careful extension of credit by retailers.
111. Id.
112. See the fact situation in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
113. One Los Angeles survey has revealed that 16% of those debtors
who had allowed their payments to lapse had done so based upon the
belief that they had been defrauded by their creditor. Nearly 61% of the
lapses were attributed to illness, loss of work and pressure from other
debts. See: WESTERN CENTER ON LAW AND POVERTY: IPACT AND EX-
TENT OF WAGE GAPNisHmENT iN Los ANGELES CouNTY 11 (1968); See also
Brunn, supra note 104, at 1245.
114. Comment, supra note 4, at n.60.
115. Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d at 556, 488 P.2d at 26, 96
Cal. Rptr., at 722 (1971). See also Notes, Attachment and Garnishment-
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come the impetus to continue the methods.
Yet it is clear that if the public does have an interest in the pres-
ervation of modern credit policies, then that interest "must be pur-
sued through the use of methods which do not deprive debtors of
their procedural due process rights."""
Like Thieves In The Night ...
The second major argument advanced by creditors is that the
absence of the speed and efficiency of a summary remedy might in-
duce a debtor to abscond with or conceal the disputed property
as soon as he is notified of a pending action."
7
As reasoned by the courts in both Randone and Blair, in some
situations this danger may be very real, and under such circum-
stances a summary remedy might well correspond with constitu-
tional principles. But neither statutory scheme challenged by ei-
ther of these cases was drawn narrowly enough to encompass only
such occasions, nor was a creditor required to point to special facts
demonstrating an actual danger.
Most summary remedies are a step in the process of collecting by
retailers against low-income wage-earning credit consumers.",,
Profiles of average debtors who are the subject of summary reme-
dies indicate that they have lived in the same city for over 20 years,
80% attend church regularly, and most have a record of steady
employment." 9 In view of this, it is unlikely that the majority of
such debtors will fold their tents in the night and silently steal
away.
THE FUENTES CASE: CULMINATION OF A TREND--JUNE 12, 1972
Origins
In June, 1967, Mrs. Margerita Fuentes, a Miami factory worker,
Garnishment of Wages Prior to Judgment Is A Denial of Due Process:
The Sniadach Case and Its Implications for Related Areas of the Law, 68
MIcH. LAw REV. 986, 997 (1970).
116. Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d at 556, 488 P.2d, at 26, 96
Cal. Rptr., at 722 (1971). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633
(1969).
117. Randone v. Appellate Dep't, 5 Cal. 3d at 556, 488 P.2d, at 26, 96
Cal. Rptr., at 722.
118. Brunn, supra note 104, at 1215.
119. WESTERN CENTER ON LAW An POVERITY, supra note 113.
purchased a gas stove under a warranty from Firestone Tire and
Rubber Co. In November, 1967, she purchased a stereo. Both items
were bought under similar conditional sales contracts which pro-
vided that in case of any default in payments, the seller, at his op-
tion could take back the merchandise. The cash price of Mrs.
Fuentes' purchases totaled close to $500.00. The finance charges
totaled over $100.00.
When the stove broke and Firestone refused to fix it, Mrs. Fu-
entes stopped paying.
Then on September 15, 1967, several months after Mrs. Fuentes
had fallen behind in payments totaling some $204.00 and had re-
ceived notice to pay or return the goods, Firestone initiated a small
claims action against her. Simultaneously, but before Mrs. Fuentes
received notice of the pending action, Firestone obtained a writ of
replevin ordering the sheriff to seize the goods. That same day a
sheriff knocked on Mrs. Fuentes' door. As she could speak little
English, a communications problem developed, and after a short
verbal skirmish with both Mrs. Fuentes' son-in-law and daughter-
in-law, two Firestone representatives, who had been waiting out-
side in their truck, were allowed to enter and take the stove and
stereo.
Mrs. Fuentes thereupon brought an action against Firestone and
the Attorney General of Florida, seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief against Florida's replevin statutes. 120 She based her
case upon two rationales, first, that the statutes violated the Due
Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment in that they provided
no notice or prior hearing' 2 ' and second, that they violated the
fourth and fourteenth amendments in that the statutes authorized
a search and seizure without a.warrant. 22
Florida law provided that for a writ of replevin to issue, Fire-
stone need only file a complaint initiating an action to repossess the
goods, and then reciting that it was lawfully entitled to possession,
and posting a security bond for twice the value of the property, the
clerk of the court was authorized to sign and stamp the documents
and summarily issue the writ.12 3 There need be no proof that the
goods were in fact being wrongfully detained. 24 In addition, if the
120. Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp., at 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
121. Mrs. Fuentes admitted that she had allowed payments to lapse but
she contended that she had a meritorious defense in that the stove was
mechanically defective and Firestone would not make satisfactory repairs.
122. Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. at 956.
123. Law of 1955, ch. 29706, § 1, (1955) Fla. Laws, 78.01 (originally en-
acted as Act of March 11, 1845, § 1).
124. Id.
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goods were in a dwelling, the writ permitted the sheriff to enter
forcibly to retake the goods.125 The seizing officer then must retain
the goods for three days during which time the buyer who has been
repossessed could retrieve the goods by posting his own security
bond for twice the value of the property. 26 If the buyer (the re-
plevin defendant) did not post his bond within the three-day limit,
the property would then go to the party first seeking the writ.
12 7
Eventually, a hearing would be held on the replevin plaintiff's or-
iginal repossession action.
A three-judge federal district court for the Southern District of
Florida rejected Mrs. Fuentes' contentions and upheld the Florida
statutes, concluding that:
• . . there are still situations in which prejudgment seizure of goods
without a prior hearing is valid... and... replevin pursuant to
a contract which authorizes a conditional seller to repossess in or-
der to protect his security interest in the goods which are the sub-
ject of the contract is one of those situations.128
In her due process argument, Mrs. Fuentes had relied heavily on
Sniadach 129 and Boddie,130 contending that the fourteenth amend-
ment prohibits repossession by a conditional seller without first
giving the vendee the benefit of a prior hearing. 31 The Florida
court found neither case controlling.
Instead, the Fuentes court utilized the rationale of the then-re-
cent Brunswick132 decision, which had expressly rejected the due
process argument advanced by its replevin defendant. Like the
Brunswick court, the Fuentes court interpreted Sniadach narrowly,
preferring to see it as a special case dealing only with wages. 33
The focus of Fuentes was upon the contractual agreement itself,
125. Id. at § 78.10.
126. Id., Mrs. Fuentes contended that she was never informed of her
three-day right to redeem the goods, and that the sheriff immediately
turned the goods over to the Firestone representatives waiting outside.
Additionally she asserted that out of 442 cases of prejudgment replevin in
Florida's Dade County small claims court in 1969, not one defendant took
advantage of the recovery provisions.
127. Id.
128. 317 F. Supp. at 958.
129. 395 U.S. 337.
130. 401 U.S. 371.
131. 317 F. Supp. at 957.
132. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
133. Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. at 957 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
which clearly called for possible repossession on default. The court
would not hear objections to a procedure which the parties had
contractually agreed to.
18 4
Mrs. Fuentes had attempted to distinguish Brunswick on the
grounds that in her case, a private party had contracted with a
commercial party while in Brunswick two commercial parties of
equal bargaining power were involved.' 35 This contention was
summarily disposed of by the court, which found this a "distinc-
tion without a difference .... -136
More technically, Mrs. Fuentes contended that the buyer in
Brunswick had admitted default. She argued that since Firestone
had breached its contract with her by failing to provide repairs,
she could not be said to be in default for refusing to make pay-
ments.1 3 7 But once again the court referred to the contractual
provisions which expressly gave Firestone the right to repossess
in the event of "default of any payment or payments"138 and not
merely upon "default." Thus Firestone's repossession rights were
defined in terms of its remedies should the buyer fall behind in
any payments,' 39 presumably for any reason.
Likewise, the court found the contract dispositive of Mrs. Fu-
entes' fourth amendment argument, thereby disregarding the ef-
fects of Camara and See.' 40 Instead, the court opted for the ancient
1856 holding of Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement
Co.' 4 1 which had held that the fourth amendment "has no refer-
ence to civil proceedings for the recovery of debts.' 1 4 2 The court
reasoned that even if, arguendo, the fourth amendment provisions
applied, the Fuentes seizure was a peaceful one 143 and thus did not
violate any statutory requirements.14 4  The court concluded that
absent authorization for a forcible taking, the fourth amendment
does not preclude parties to a conditional sales contract from con-
tracting for a peaceful repossession. 45
134. Brunswick v. J -& P Inc., 424 F.2d, at 105 (10th Cir. 1970). Cited
in Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp., at 957 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 958.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See text accompanying notes 54 and 55 supra.
141. 59 U.S. 272 (1856).
142. Id. at 285.
143. Even admitting the reluctance of Mrs. Fuentes to allow entry to
the repossessors.
144. Laws of 1927, § 5338 (1927) Fla. Laws 78.10 (originally enacted as
Act of March 11, 1845, § 7).
145. Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp., at 958 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
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Two years after Mrs. Fuentes' repossession occurred, on Febru-
ary 1, 1969, Paul Parham, a citizen of Pennsylvania, entered into an
installment sales contract similar to that signed by Mrs. Fuentes.
Likewise, his contract permitted the seller to repossess the furni-
ture he had purchased should he default in payments. When de-
fault did occur, and following repeated telephone and written com-
munications urging payment, the seller, Sears, Roebuck and Co.,
repossessed the furniture pursuant to a writ of replevin and in
conformance with existing Pennsylvania law.
Joining with two other Pennsylvania citizens who had suffered
similar experiences-one Michael Epps and one Rosa Washington-
a class action was instituted against each of their respective cred-
itors1 40 challenging the state replevin statutes. 147 The plaintiffs
sought a permanent injunction restraining the Prothonotary of the
Courts of Philadelphia County and the Sheriff of Philadelphia
County from issuing and executing any further writs of replevin.
The statutes at issue were essentially the same as Florida's. The
greatest exception appears to have been that unlike Florida, Penn-
sylvania did not require that a hearing ever be held to present the
merits of the conflicting claims. 148 Although there was an estab-
lished hearing procedure, it was an option open to the creditor
which he might or might not elect to pursue. 49 In order to get
any hearing at all, the person who had lost the property must have
initiated a suit himself within 20 days after he had been served
with the writ.150 Or, he might post his own counterbond within
three days after seizure to regain possession of the goods.1 5 '
The Pennsylvania plaintiffs challenged the state procedure on
three grounds: due process, equal protection and fourth amend-
ment.
The court maintained that due process had not been violated
since the defendant was given notice, albeit at the time of the tak-
ing itself, and since the defendants could have retrieved the goods
146. On Mrs. Washington's part, her action was brought against her
husband.
147. Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
148. Law of June 25, 1946, (1946) 12 Penn. Rules of Civil Proc. 1073.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1037.
151. Id. at 1076.
and/or challenged the temporary taking, the requirement of a
"hearing" had been complied with.152 Thus the court could find
no irreparable harm or unconscionable hardships "akin to those
suffered in Sniadach, Goldberg, and the related cases cited by (the)
plaintiffs."' 53 Rather, the state and creditor interests adverted to
in Sniadach'54 were present in that the state had a prevailing inter-
est since summary seizure "conserves State financial resources and
administrative time in reducing the number of evidentiary hear-
ings in a given lawsuit."' 55
The equal protection argument was dismissed on the grounds
that but for the stated fact that the plaintiff Epps earned in ex-
cess of $10,000.00 per year, the record was altogether silent on the
economic status of the plaintiffs. 50  As such, the court would not
consider the issue.
The fourth amendment argument found its basis in the Fuentes
decision. 5 7 The court reasoned that since the seizures had not
been at unreasonable hours, had not been forceful and were pri-
marily civil in nature, the fourth amendment did not apply. 58
When the smoke of the lower court battles had cleared in Florida
and Pennsylvania, the groundwork was set for joint appeals to the
U.S. Supreme Court. Thus a prime opportunity had arisen for that
court to not only clarify the scope of Sniadach, but to lay to rest
the problems which had ensued during the three-year struggle to
clarify the Sniadach ruling as applied to summary creditor reme-
dies.
Undoing Wrongs Already Done...
On June 12, 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court rendered its decision
in the joint cases of Fuentes and Epps.159 Mr. Justice Potter Stew-
art writing for the 4-3 majority'6" held that a consumer who falls
behind in payments has a constitutional right to a hearing before
any of his goods can be repossessed. As such, the Supreme Court
viewed the replevin provisions of Florida and Pennsylvania as evil
-albeit to different degrees.' 6'
152. Epps v. Cortese, 326 F. Supp. at 135 (1971).
153. Id. at 134.
154. Id. at 135.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 137.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
160. Justices Lewis Powell, Jr. and William Rehnquist did not take
part in the decision since the case was argued before they were appointed
to the bench.
161. 407 U.S. at 73.
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The principle base upon which the decision rested was the pro-
cedural due process argument. Specifically, it was found that the
states' statutes were defective for failing to provide hearings "at a
meaningful time."'162 Although Florida had provided a hearing
after seizure and Pennsylvania allowed a post-seizure hearing if the
aggrieved party voluntarily shouldered the burden of initiating
one, 103 neither provided a prior hearing. The crux of the contro-
versy thus centered around the propriety of a state's participation
in ex parte summary remedies. 4 The concern in this area, stated
the Court, rests not so much with abstract terms of "fair play"'165
as with the need to protect an individual's use and possession of
property from arbitrary encroachment and mistaken depriva-
tions.106 Fairness, reasoned the Court, could best be obtained when
an adverse party has a chance to speak up in his own behalf.
167
Although a later hearing might return an individual's property to
him if it was unfairly or mistakenly taken in the first place-and
damages might even be awarded-it would not erase the fact that
a wrongful taking had occurred. 68  "This Court has not ... em-
braced the general proposition that a wrong may be done if it can
be undone."'01 9
For purposes of the Fuentes decision, it is clear that the right to
a prior hearing attaches only to a deprivation of an interest encom-
passed within the protection of the fourteenth amendment. 70 As
such, the Court found itself having to clarify several issues.
Deprivation Defined
The first problem faced by the Court was defining exactly what
constitutes a "deprivation" within the context of the fourteenth
162. Id. at 1994.
163. See discussion of Florida and Pennsylvania replevin procedures
at pp. 310-314 supra.
164. A judicial proceeding is said to be ex parte if it is taken or granted
at the request and for the benefit of one party only, and without notice
to, or contestation by any person adversely interested. BLAcK's LAW Dic-
TIONARY 661 (4th ed. 1968).
165. This concept had been emphasized by Mr. Justice Harlan in his
concurring opinion in Sniadach, 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
166. 407 U.S. at 81.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 82.
170. Id.
amendment. Citing Sniadach, the Court stated that even a tempo-
rary, nonfinal taking of property is a deprivation. 1' Although a
replevin defendant like Mrs. Fuentes had a three-day period during
which the goods could be returned, it was forcefully argued that
very few persons in a replevin defendant's position are financially
able to post the required bond, even if they know of the existence
of the possibility.172 As the Court stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright lines around three-
day, 10-day or 50-day deprivations of property. Any significant
taking of property by the State is within the purview of the Due
Process Clause.1 73
It is clear that although the length and severity of a taking may
be factors to weigh in 'determining the appropriate type of hearing,




The Court then had to face the problem of defining what a "sig-
nificant property interest" is. The question undoubtedly arose be-
cause appellants Fuentes and Parham actually lacked full, legal
title to the goods in their possession-having purchased under con-
ditional sales agreements. Upon default, the question of owner-
ship was put into dispute. The Court in this respect noted that
the fourteenth amendment's protection of property has never been
interpreted as safeguarding only the rights of undisputed owner-
ship. 1 5 The fact that appellants had agreed to pay a major financ-
ing charge and at the time of the repossessions had made substan-
tial payments 1 7 6 was thought clearly sufficient to bring into play
the protection of the fourteenth amendment.
77
Necessities of Life
A final problem apparently settled by the Fuentes court was the
determining of what is a "necessity of life." Since the Sniadach
decision and its language couched in terms of "the special quality
of wages,' 78 the state courts had bantered about the question of
171. Id.
172. Id. at 84-85.
173. Id. at 86.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. At the time of the taking Mrs. Fuentes owed $200. The original bill
had been close to $600.
177. 407 U.S. at 86.
178. Sniadach v. Family Finance, 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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whether the property with which each was then dealing fell within
Sniadach's "special quality" category. 179  Instead of deciding
whether or not household items do indeed fall within the enunci-
ated protections of Sniadach's language, the Fuentes Court in a
most perfunctory manner divorced the entire question of "necessi-
ties" from the issue of procedural due process.'80 The whole prob-
lem, noted the Court, arose because Sniadach and Goldberg had
been read too narrowly. Rather, both of these decisions had been
"in the mainstream of past cases, having little or nothing to do
with the absolute 'necessities' of life . . ,"':8 As such, due proc-
ess principles are not to be limited to the protection of a few types
of property. Sniadach and Goldberg merely "emphasized" the im-
portance of certain interests-they did not limit the due process
concepts to certain interests.
82
Additionally, although the Court recognized that there may in-
deed be gradations in the importance of various consumer goods,
the "root principle" of procedural due process, if it is to be objec-
tively applied, cannot rest on these distinctions. 8 3 When the four-
teenth amendment speaks of "property" it speaks in general terms.
It does not become the business of a court to make an individual
evaluation of what is or is not "necessary."'1 4 The Fuentes court
recognized that subjectively, "necessity" distinctions are not feas-
ible since it can be argued that all property should be protected-
stoves and wages alike. Realistically, courts could not consistently
draw the line as to what is or is not "necessary."
The Fuentes court found a fatal flaw not only in the theory ad-
vanced by the creditors, but in the contract itself. It had been con-
tended that by signing the conditional sales contract the debtors
179. For an argument which includes household goods as well as wages,
see Laprease v. Raymours Furniture, 315 F. Supp. at 722. There, the
court stated that "Beds, stoves, mattresses . . . and other necessities for
ordinary day to day living are, like wages in Sniadach, a 'specialized type
of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system,' the taking
of which on the unilateral command of an adverse party 'may impose
tremendous hardships' on purchasers of these essentials." For a negative
criticism of such line-drawing see Comment, supra note 19, at 896.
180. 407 U.S. at 89.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 89-90.
184. Id. at 90.
had waived their procedural due process rights whether or not
the contract specifically called for repossession."" In both the
Fuentes and Parham cases terms of repossession were included in
the printed form contracts and appeared in small type unaccom-
panied by explanation.
In deciding the question of waiver, the Fuentes court set forth
four criteria for a waiver's validity:
30
(a) there has been bargaining by both parties over the terms of
the contract
(b) there is a balance of bargaining power between parties
(c) the provisions are not merely a printed part of the contract
and a necessary condition of sale
(d) the debtor has been made aware or is already aware of the
significance of the provisions
At the very least, any waiver provision must be clear on its face.
13 7
In the instant case, the contracts had merely provided for repos-
session upon default. The contracts did not indicate how or by
what process the seller could repossess. As such there was no vol-
untary, intelligent waiver of the specific right to a hearing prior
to the repossession.
1 88
The Fuentes dissent, written by Mr. Justice White and joined in
by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun rested upon three
bases. First, that appellants Parham and Fuentes had not ex-
hausted all of their procedural remedies since they had ample op-
portunity to raise any issues they had in the state court proceed-
ings then pending.18 9 Second, Mr. Justice White contended that
the majority had wholly neglected the creditor interests in the mat-
ter. Between the time of default and the final adjudication the in-
terests of the buyer and seller are naturally antagonistic. The
buyer wishes to continue using the property pending a final judg-
ment, and the seller wishes to prevent further use and deteriora-
tion in his security interest. The dissenters felt that the existing
laws were commendable since the buyer might temporarily lose the
use of the property, but he is at the same time "protected against
loss."'19  To the dissenters the issue was quite simple-either the
185. Id. at 94.
186. Id. at 94-95.
187. Id. at 95.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 99.
190. The dissenters do not make clear the meaning of "protected against
loss." One can only suspect that they are drawing a theoretical distinc-
tion between the '"esser" evil of temporary loss of use and permanent loss
of the property itself. The majority opinion contended that such a the-
oretical distinction is without merit since a temporary physical loss amounts
to a permanent loss of use over a given period of time.
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buyer has defaulted, or he has not.191 If he has, then it is both
fair and essential that the seller be allowed to repossess. They did
not see the threat of mistaken claims as sufficient to justify a prior
hearing.192 Curiously deleted from their argument is any attempt
to deal with the majority's claim that arbitrary as well as mistaken
claims must be protected against. At the very least, observed the
dissenters, a defaulting buyer should be required to make his de-
faulted payments into court.
193
Third, implies the dissent, a seller could evade the court's ruling
simply by making it clear at the outset that the buyer is waiving
his procedural due process rights and that the seller can repossess
without a hearing.9 4 All the seller need do is be sure that the
buyer is correctly waiving his rights. To the dissent, it is unlikely
that a prior hearing would do any more than the existing laws al-
ready do.195 As it noted, "the procedure which the court strikes
down is not some barbaric hangover from bygone days."'196
Several items should be borne in mind in light of the Fuentes
decision. First, Fuentes considered state action in ex parte suits.
It did not comment on what its course of action would have been
had the repossessions been effectuated through private, rather than
state action. Thus this very related question and an equally com-
plex one must be left for further judicial consideration.
97
Second, Mrs. Fuentes had paid about two-thirds of her contrac-
tual obligation. The court found that this was a "significant prop-
erty interest" on her part. But the court failed to say at what
point in a given contract a buyer possesses such an interest suffi-
cient to bring him within the protection of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Does a buyer merit such protection after having paid fifty
dollars of a $600 bill? Perhaps the question is best left to a case-by-
case analysis. But it does seem to leave the issue open for chal-
lenge by creditors. Although this may prove a straw dog, it ap-
191. 407 U.S. at 100.
192. Id.




197. The question is considered in Adams v. Egley's Recovery Service,
338 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
pears to have inherent within it the same line-drawing problems
faced in the "necessities" issue.
Third, although Mrs. Fuentes based her argument in part on the
fourth amendment, the court saw no need to decide that issue, rea-
soning that once a prior hearing is required and the strength of a
creditor's claim is tested, the fourth amendment problem is obvi-
ated.198
Even though the court did not decide the issue, a hint as to its
potential disposition (should the question ever arise more directly)
might well be found in Footnote 30. Here, the court draws a sharp
distinction between writs of replevin and seizure of goods under a
search warrant. First, a search warrant is designed to serve "a
highly important governmental need," i.e. the apprehension and
conviction of criminals rather than to serve the private needs of
individuals. Second, a search warrant is issued under circum-
stances where prompt action is needed to prevent the destruction
or withholding of evidence. Third, the fourth amendment guaran-
tees that a state will not issue a warrant merely upon application
of a private party. Thus, unlike in the replevin statutes at issue,100
the state does not abdicate control over search warrants since there
must be a showing of probable cause prior to the issuance of a war-
rant.
By setting forth these distinctions, it is clear that the court saw
it better to decide the replevin question solely in terms of due proc-
ess. As such, there may have been a genuine fear that should situ-
ations requiring replevin be drawn analogous to those involving the
fourth amendment, the reverse might also be applied. Thus the
court made it clear that the Fuentes decision "in no way implies
that there must be opportunity for an adversary hearing before
a search warrant is issued.
'20 0
In reaching its conclusions, the Fuentes court maintained a nar-
row posture. It did not question the power of the State to seize
goods prior to a final adjudication in order to protect the security
interest of a creditor-as long as the creditor's claim is tested and
found valid by a fair hearing. In turn, the method employed to test
a creditor's claim was clearly left to each state's legislature. This,
in keeping with the concept that although the form of procedural
198. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 96.
199. Id. at 93; the court pointed out that the replevin statutes at issue
revealed that although the state was the arm of the enforcement, the state
itself acted largely in the dark-with little or no state control over the
actual replevin.
200. Id. at n.30.
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due process may vary, the basic requirements, e.g. notice and a prior
hearing, do not.
AFTEmwATH
Fuentes did settle some of the questions which had been plaguing
the courts since Sniadach. The decision will undoubtedly have
great impact in those states which did not initiate the Fuentes pro-
cedural requirements prior to the decision itself. But, at least in
California, the ruling can be viewed in one sense as anticlimactic
and in another sense as incomplete.
It appears at this time that the decision will not make a dramatic
change in California procedures. 20 1 Adversary hearings such as
those called for in Fuentes have been law in California since early
1972-the result of the Randone case.20 2 As the procedure now
stands, items can be attached pursuant to a writ of replevin only
after an ex parte hearing where it has been shown that besides the
creditor's having a legitimate claim, irreparable injury would be
suffered if the goods were not attached. In this respect, each case
is weighed on its own merits.
If a creditor can show irreparable injury, an item can be at-
tached immediately and the debtor may come down the very next
day and appeal the action. Injury to the debtor, it has been ex-
plained,203 will be very slight since the courts are open every after-
noon for ex parte matters. Although the greater number of such
hearings involve businesses, of those involving the wage earner,
most concern new automobiles.
204
In the Municipal Court of the Los Angeles District, fewer requests
for writs of attachment have been made since Randone.20 5 The
Clerk's office there reports that writs for attachment were down
80% in 1972 and the court itself has held only two adversary hear-
ings.2
0 6
In San Diego, the County Sheriff's Civil Bureau has reported
that its claim and delivery actions have ceased-this, in response to
201. See comments by Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Robert A.
Wenke: 85 Los ANGELES DAILY JOURNAL 1 (No. 119, June 15, 1972).
202. 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709.
203. Comments by Judge Robert A. Wenke, supra note 201.
204. Id.
205. Los ANGELES DAILY JOURNAL, supra note 201,
206. Id.
the Blair decision.207  To the knowledge of a spokesman for the
Bureau, there has not been a state aided repossession or claim and
delivery this year. This is a significant break-off from the average
two per month of last year. Thus it appears that as a result of
earlier California decisions, Fuentes did not come as a shock to state
procedure, but rather as an anticlimax.
On the other hand Fuentes may be viewed as not having gone
far enough. Although the decision did resolve state-assisted sum-
mary remedy questions, it did not resolve a four month old Cali-
fornia debate over how a private creditor might repossess without
the aid of state officers.
On February 11, 1972, U.S. District Judge Leland C. Nielson in
San Diego ruled that notice and hearing are also required before
a creditor can repossess items himself or hire someone to do it for
him.20 8 Although the decision caused a temporary halt in private
repossessions, two weeks later U.S. District Judge Spencer Williams
in San Francisco ruled that his court did not have jurisdiction in
such matters.
209
Given the resultant conflict most lenders proceeded to abandon
curbs they had instituted after the Nielson decision. 210 As stated
by the vice president of a major banking institution, "they haven't
given us a final opinion, so on an operating basis, we decided to go
ahead as always."2 11
Although Fuentes leaves a larger question yet unanswered, it
may at least give some indication of the way in which the court is
leaning.
UNRESOLVED: PRIVATE REPOSSESSION PROCEDURES
In light of the cases considered thus far, and supported now by
the Fuentes decision, consumer advocates are contending that ex-
trajudicial takings pursuant to conditional sales contract provisions
suffer the same constitutional infirmities as judicial takings prior
to Blair, Randone, and Fuentes.2 12 The counterargument being ad-
207. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42.
208. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
209. Oller v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972). The
problem of federal jurisdiction claims is discussed infra at p. 325.
210. Fisher, Repossessors Active As Court Scare Fades, Los Angeles
Times, June 19, 1972 (Part 1I), at 13, col. 6. Al HIartgraves, President of
Western Adjusters, a private repossessing company, stated that with the
exception of some out-of-state creditors, most lenders are continuing to
order repossessions.
211. Id.
212. Ordin, supra note 47, at 238.
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vanced by creditors is that unlike the latter seizures, takings by
private persons pursuant to valid contract provisions are not sub-
ject to regulation by due process and search and seizure princi-
ples, 213 which apply only where there is state action.
In response to this argument it has been pointed out that there
are various California statutes regulating "private taking." More
specifically, there is the Unruh Act, §§ 1801 et seq. which define
the rights of a retail seller who retains a security interest to retake
goods upon any default, pursuant to rights granted in the given
contract. Although the dispossessed buyer has a ten-day period
in which to redeem the goods,214 this redemption power may be
limited by the seller's right to demand full payment before the
goods can be redeemed. 215 Additionally, the section does not pro-
vide for prior notice or an opportunity to protest the taking before
the repossession occurs.
The Rees-Levering Act governing the sales of automobiles pro-
vides that the seller of an automobile may repossess it upon the
buyer's default in payment,216 and the California Uniform Com-
mercial Code §§ 9503 and 9504 regulate repossession and disposition
of collateral by a secured party.
It is forcefully argued by some that even if these statutes are
repealed or declared unconstitutional, such decisions as Reitman v.
Mulkey 217 require a finding that the state, through condonation of
private repossession, has in fact become a participant such that the
fourteenth amendment becomes applicable to private takings as
well as state-assisted takings. One could point out that the Ran-
done court could well have been contemplating such an argument
when in a piece of "significant dictum" it stated that:
213. Id.
214. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1812.2 (West 1964).
215. Id.
216. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2981 et seq. (West 1964).
217. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1966). In this case, the U.S. Su-
preme Court affirmed sub nom. the California Supreme Court decision
that Article I, Section 26 of the California Constitution (which repealed
existing "fair housing laws" and made passage of future laws possible
only by constitutional amendment) was unconstitutional; the court ac-
cepting the reasoning of the California Supreme Court that the allegedly
neutral position taken by the state was in fact approval of private acts
of discrimination. See also Ordin, supra note 47, at n.47. Reitman gives
the broadest possible interpretation of state action. It is questionable
whether such a broad test will be upheld in all areas of the law.
Indeed, California courts have long preserved the individual's
right to notice and a meaningful hearing in instances in which a
significant deprivation is threatened by a private entity as well as
a governmental body.218
Even if it is found that there is insufficient state action in extra-
judicial repossessions to invoke the protections of the fourteenth
amendment, it does not necessarily follow that creditors will pre-
vail in enforcing such private repossessions. Both in Blair and
Fuentes the courts were very skeptical about the alleged "consent"
contained in adhesion contracts.219 If an adhesion provision in a
printed contract cannot constitute an effective waiver, it is also
unlikely that the provision will be found to be an enforceable con-
tractual consent to an extrajudicial taking.
220
Therefore it is clear that it may be even more difficult to deter-
mine the constitutionality of private takings than judicial takings.
But it is a question that needs a speedy answer, for at present there
exists an anomoly in the California law. On one hand, creditors
cannot use statutory procedures which have been enforced through
the use of sheriffs or marshalls, yet creditors may effect essentially
the same type of summary taking through "self help. '22 1 It may
seem sheer judicial hypocrisy to assert that procedural safeguards
are necessary when an officer of the law comes to the door, but
such safeguards are not required when a creditor uses self help to
effectuate the same purposes. 222 Either way, the debtor is subject
to the same acts. It might even be argued that procedurally, the
potential for abuse is even greater in a self help situation. It
would defy logic to apply safeguards to one situation but not the
other.
Adams v. Egley: Extrajudicial Takings Squarely Faced
The question of the constitutionality of extrajudicial repossession
is now being hotly contested in the California District courts. The
case squarely presenting the issues is the February 11, 1972 decision
of San Diego District Court Judge Leland C. Nielson in Adams v.
Egley's Recovery Service22 3 and the companion case Posadas v. Star
218. 5 Cal. 3d at 550 n.11, 488 P.2d at 22, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 718 (citations
omitted).
219. Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d at 275, 486 P.2d at 1254, 96 Cal. Rptr.
at 54 (1971); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); and see Ordin, supra
note 47, at 239.
220. Id.
221. See Ordin, supra note 47, at 240.
222. Id.
223. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Cal. 1972); for a Florida
decision in agreement with Adams, see McCormick v. First National
Bank of Miami, 322 F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
[VOL. 10: 292, 1973] Law Note
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
and Crescent.
224
Plaintiffs in both actions had borrowed sums of money and had,
pursuant to security agreements, offered an automobile (Adams)
and a truck (Star) as security. Both security agreements provided
that in case of default of any term or condition of the security
agreement or promissory notes, the secured party would be enti-
tled to repossess the security according to law. The law in ques-
tion in the case is specifically California Uniform Commercial Code
§§ 9-503 and 9-504 which provide for the repossession and disposition
of collateral by a secured party after default by a debtor.225
The first question considered by the Adams court was whether
it had jurisdiction over the case at all. Plaintiffs had asserted two
bases of jurisdiction: federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, and jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1343
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The federal question purportedly raised was
whether such extrajudicial repossession violated the due process
provisions of the fourteenth amendment. The Civil Rights sections
provide for a judicial remedy where one is deprived of any consti-
tutional or statutory right by any person acting "under color" of
state law. It was fundamental to either basis of jurisdiction to find
that there was significant state action in the alleged wrongful acts.
The defendant-creditor challenged the jurisdiction of the court
on the basis that what was involved was private contracts with
self-executing terms. Unlike prior cases involving attachment, re-
plevin, or claim and delivery, what was involved was self help.
Therefore by private agreement the creditor either by himself or
by means of a private collection agency can enter onto the debtor's
premises and repossess the goods in dispute-all without the aid of
any state official. Therefore they argued that there was no state
action upon which to found federal jurisdiction.
The Adams court did not agree. Citing Reitman v. Mulkey226 the
court stated that
224. Posadas v. Star and Crescent, Federal Credit Union, 338 F. Supp.
614 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
225. Section 9-503 provides that a secured party may proceed to take
possession without judicial process if this can be done without a breach of
the peace. Further, Section 9-504 allows the secured party to dispose of
the property by "selling, leasing, or otherwise" disposing of it in a "com-
mercially reasonable manner."
226. 387 U.S. 369 (1966).
• . . in the mere enactment of the statute (authorizing private re-
possession) state involvement (is) sufficient to bring the alleged
acts ... within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment.
22 7
Although admittedly the repossessions were private acts pursuant
to contractual provisions, the court found that Sections 9-503 and
9-504 unquestionably had a significant impact on the content of the
contractual provisions.2 28 Indeed, both contracts had either spe-
cifically referred to the provisions or "the law governing reposses-
sions." The court reasoned that there was ample indication that
the creditors were persuaded or induced to include repossession by
the fact that such procedures were permitted by the statutes. 220
As stated by the court:
These Commercial Code sections set forth a state policy, and the se-
curity agreements upon which the instant actions rest, whose terms
are authorized by the statute and which incorporate its provisions,
are merely an embodiment of that policy.
23o
Once the question of jurisdiction had been settled, the primary
issue, whether the repossession in question violated procedural due
process requirements, came easily. It must be remembered that
since Adams was decided four months before Fuentes made clear
the scope to be given Sniadach, the Adams court faced the decision
of how broad a scope Sniadach and its progeny were to be given.
The court opted for a broad view of that case, deciding that a stat-
ute providing for private repossession without notice or hearing is
not exempt from constitutional scrutiny merely because its opera-
tion is confined to situations involving the presence of a con-
tract.
23 1
At any rate, even though the contract itself may be valid, the
Adams court challenged the validity of the argument that such
rights had been contractually waived, 232 noting that the presump-
tion against contractual waiver of rights is well settled,2 33 particu-
227. 338 F. Supp. 617.
228. Id.
229. Id. But be sure to note the counterargument advanced in Oiler,
342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972). In addition, a case presenting the iden-
tical problem of state action in regard to the New Jersey U.C.C. provisions
(equivalent to Sections 9-503 and 9-504 of the California U.C.C.) has been
decided. Following a discussion of Adams and Oler, it reached the con-
clusion that there had not been state action. It based this decision on the
fact that self-help is a pre-Code remedy and was specifically written into
Section 9-503. Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 41 U.S.L.W. 2211 (October
24, 1972).
230. Id. at 618.
231. Id. at 620.
232. The creditors had set forth this argument and had relied heavily on
Brunswick, 424 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970).
233. See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Swarb v.
Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), prob. jur. noted, 401 U.S. 991
(1971).
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larly where the parties are not of equal bargaining power and an
"adhesion contract" is involved. The court reasoned that if the
provisions of a contract can legitimize summary repossession, even
wage garnishment might be valid under the same theory as long
as private agreement could be shown.234 Such an argument was
rejected by Adams as flying in the face of Sniadach reasoning.
In turn, by ascertaining the significance of the identities of the
parties to the agreement, Adams intimates that where the parties
are of equal bargaining power a waiver might indeed be effec-
tive.236 But as may be pointed out, neither Section 9-503 nor 9-504
is drawn narrowly enough to confine its application to parties of
equal bargaining power.
23 6
It may also be noted that the Adams court was also struggling
with the problem of "daily necessities. '2 37 This problem has since
been resolved by the Fuentes decision2381 and need not be consid-
ered further here.
The Adams ruling ended in a note of hesitancy concerning the
current judicial trend in that Judge Nielson foresaw possible rises
in prices and interest rates as an outgrowth of restraints on
creditors. 23 9 This fear is based on the premise that creditors
traditionally exercise "considerable flexibility and exhaust all al-
ternatives" before resorting to summary actions.240 This note by
the court should be prefaced by the term "reputable." But it is
not at such creditors that such decisions are ultimately aimed. If
a creditor is honest, constitutional tenets will not be greeted with
hostility. On the other hand, dishonest business practices, whether
initiated by state or private interests, will either fold or be sub-
jected to judicial scrutiny.
The Adams case is currently being appealed before the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals and it may be some time before a final decision is
reached-perhaps not until the summer of 1973. Undoubtedly
the state action issues and jurisdictional question loom as the




238. See discussion accompanying the text of n.180 supra.
239. 338 F. Supp. at 622.
240. Id.
greatest problems. But given the trend of cases up to the Fuentes
decision, it is not an impossibility that the California court will
elect to treat a private repossession differently than one involv-
ing state assistance. From the debtor's point of view it would
seem to make little difference who is in fact taking the property
from him. The question is "how" that property is being taken.
Granted there is a constitutional difference in that the fourteenth
amendment requires that there be state action. But it can be ar-
gued that that requirement is fulfilled by the enactment of a state
law regulating the repossession procedure as well as physical par-
ticipation by the state in the actual repossession. What is needed
is a definitive statement of what constitutes state action. Such a
statement was initiated in Reitman in regard to racial discrimina-
tion. It now remains for the California courts to determine
whether such a definition should apply equally to other areas of the
law. It seems insufficient to limit such a definition to physical par-
ticipation by the state when the essence of the matter is actually
the state's policy-be it active enforcement or statutory mandates.
Indeed, if Reitman and Randone are to be given any credibility, the
Adams decision must be affirmed.241 The alternative is to limit
Reitmans rationale to the facts of that case.
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN CALIFORNIA
Ideally, legislation proposed to alleviate the constitutional short-
comings of those statutes recently found deficient should protect
both the consumer and the creditor-the creditor from undue de-
lays and depreciation in the value of his security, and the con-
sumer from unfair seizures.
In order to comply with the guidelines expressed in Randone,
Blair, Goldberg, and Fuentes while at the same time providing
for legal seizures, prejudgment attachments and claim and delivery
statutes should provide for such takings only in extraordinary
situations. 242 Under any other situations the procedure must pro-
vide for both notice and hearing on the validity of the creditor's
claim.
24 3
Unfortunately, solutions have not been readily forthcoming from
the state legislature. Indeed most proposals have failed to muster
enough enthusiasm to get out of committee.
244
241. It may be interesting to note that the Supreme Court in Fuentes
cited Adams as part of the trend to read Sniadach broadly. This may be
significant in that the Fuentes court sanctioned such a broad interpretation.
See Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 at n.5 (1972).
242. Ordin, supra note 47, at 234.
243. Id.
244. E.g., A.B. 1225 (1970) authored by Yvonne Braithwaite subsequent
to Sniadach and prior to Blair and Randone; and A.B. 2012 (1971) spon-
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In its 1972 Session (which adjourned at the end of the summer),
the California legislature wrestled with the statutory voids created
by the current trend in court decisions. In the Assembly, three
bills were introduced. One of those bills24 5 attempted to constitu-
tionally revive attachment by providing the possessor of property
prior notice of an adverse party's claims and an opportunity to re-
fute the claims by either affidavit or testimony at a judicial hear-
ing. This bill was killed in committee.
A second bill246 would have been applicable only to items de-
fined as "necessities of life." It would have barred a creditor from
personally repossessing property and would have required a law
enforcement officer to make the actual repossession. This bill also
did not survive committee. One might note that the bill depended
upon the classification of "necessities of life"-a classification in-
validated by the Fuentes decision shortly before the bill's defeat.
Two Assembly bills have been approved by the legislature and
have been signed by the governor. California's Code of Civil Pro-
cedure § 509 et seq.247 (claim and delivery statutes) have been re-
vised to enable a person who wants to repossess property to obtain
a court order directing a sheriff's officer to seize the property for
him.
2 48
sored by Assemblyman Waxman subsequent to Blair and Randone, at-
tempted to institute a constitutional extrajudicial repossession statute
prior to any definitive court test of the validity of extrajudicial repossession.
245. A.B. 2294 (1972) introduced by Assemblyman John Stufl.
246. A.B. 541 (1972) submitted by Assemblyman Waxman.
247. A.B. 1623 (1972) introduced by Assemblyman Charles Warren.
248. The new bill provides that where a delivery is claimed the plaintiff
by complaint, affidavit, or declaration shall show; (1) that the plaintiff is
the owner of the property claimed or is entitled to the possession of the
property; (2) that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant,
the means by which the defendant came into possession of the property,
and the cause of the detention; (3) a description of the property.
If the affidavit, complaint or declaration meets the above requirements
to the court's satisfaction, an order to show cause will be directed at the
defendant to demonstrate why the property should not be taken from him
and given to the plaintiff. The order will fix the time and place for a
hearing no sooner than 10 days from its issuance. The order will inform
the defendant that he can file affidavits on his own behalf and present tes-
timony at the hearing, or he might file with the court a written under-
taking to stay delivery of the property.
The court may issue a writ of possession prior to a hearing if there ap-
pears probable cause that: (1) the defendant gained possession by theft;
(2) the property is negotiable or is a credit card; (3) by reason of specific,
The measure takes effect under an "urgency" provision which
allows the bill to go into effect immediately. The bill will become
inoperative on January 1, 1975-at least temporarily filling the
current statutory void until more permanent measures can be im-
plemented.
The bill affects only judicial repossessions and leaves extraju-
dicial self help remedies unaffected. Thus a claimant can repos-
sess collateral of a security agreement without the court's super-
vision.
Notice to the possessor that a hearing on possession is pending
is given by means of personal service or as the court determines to
be reasonably calculated to afford notice. The claimant may ob-
tain the property without notice and hearing to the possessor
where possession is by theft, where the property is negotiable,
where the property will perish before a hearing can be set, or
where there is danger of destruction, serious harm, concealment,
removal from the state, or sale to a bona fide purchaser. Addi-
tionally, there must be a showing of the actual threat of one of
the former.
At the hearing, evidence may consist of the complaint, affidavits,
competent testimony within the personal knowledge of an affiant or wit-
ness, the property is perishable and will perish before any hearing can be
had, or is in the immediate danger of destruction or harm, concealment, or
the holder of the property threatens to sell it to a bona fide purchaser.
If a writ of possession is granted a plaintiff, the defendant may apply
to the court for an order shortening the time on the hearing for the order to
show cause, and the court may, upon such application, shorten the time
and direct that the matter be heard on not less than 48 hours notice to the
plaintiff.
Upon the order to show cause, the court shall consider the showing made
by both parties and shall make a preliminary determination of which
party, with reasonable probability is entitled to possession or use, pending
final adjudication of the parties' claims.
A writ of possession shall not issue until the plaintiff has filed a written
undertaking consisting of two or more sureties to the affect that they are
bound to the defendant for double the value of the property.
The writ is then directed to the sheriff or marshall of the jurisdiction
where the property is located. The officer then would take the property
from the defendant and retain it in his custody either by removing the
property to a safe place or installing a "keeper" at the expense of the
plaintiff. The officer may demand that the property be delivered over to
him by the defendant and may call the power of his county into play to
get it. The statute authorizes the officer to cause the building housing the
property to be "broken open."
It may be noted that the new law still allows the defendant to secure a
return of the property by posting his own bond.
The stated purpose of the legislation in enacting this statute was to
give persons claiming the right to property the legal remedies to so claim
within the stated requirements of Blair.
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testimony and other evidence. The hearing court, though, is not
required to find probable cause that the state and creditor's inter-
ests in possession outweigh the possessor's right to be secure from
unreasonable searches and seizures. It appears clear that at least
for the time being, the California legislature is steering clear of
fourth amendment entanglements.
249
In addition to changes in the claim and delivery statutes, Section
537 et seq. of the California Code of Civil Procedure have been re-
pealed, and a revised section has replaced it. 250 This new bill per-
tains to a plaintiff in an action against a defendant (a defendant
who is a corporation, partnership, individual engaged in a trade or
business, or a person not residing in California, or one who is evad-
ing a summons) for a liquidated sum of money based upon a loan,
a negotiable instrument, services rendered or the sale or lease of
real or personal property. The plaintiff in the prescribed action
may attach all corporate or partnership property, and the inven-
tory, accounts, contract rights, bank accounts, securities, equip-
ment, and real estate of an individual engaged in trade or busi-
ness. The new attachment provisions further provide for a hearing
procedure in these cases of attachment.
Hopefully, these bills will prove beneficial until both the case
trend and developments within the legislature itself take a turn
toward even greater clarification of what type of legislation is
feasible. If the Adams decision is upheld, it will entail even more
legislative action than can be foreseen at this point.
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CONCLUSION
Although it is now clear that Sniadach has ushered into existence
a period of change in the traditional notions of creditor prejudg-
ment remedies, it would be unwise at this point in time to conclude
that the summary remedy has breathed its last breath. Indeed,
the only real tests of the doctrine thus far have come in the area
of retail installment contracts. It yet remains to be seen whether
the principles thus far considered will be successfully extended to
the myriad of creditor remedies that remain.
249. See text accompanying n.84 supra.
250. Senate Bill 1048 (1972).
251. See discussion supra note 208.
- Even at the time of this writing, one sacred bastion of the bank-
ing industry, the banker's lien, is being challenged under the Snia-
dach rationale.252 And what of the Uniform Commercial Code pro-
visions? 253  Unruh Act repossession provisions? Rees-Levering?
Garagemen's liens? Paying taxes? or turning off one's electricity
for lack of payment? Although the scope of this article has been
the Sniadach trend in retail installment cases, it is imperative that
one remember the true extent of the subject with which we are
dealing. The success of the Sniadach rationale in installment con-
tract cases does not guarantee a like success in other areas of the
law-areas where the evils of adhesion contracts and unscrupulous
sellers are not present, and where valid reasons may exist for the
continuance of a summary procedure. Who could doubt the ab-
surdity of granting hearings prior to the "taking" of taxes? In-
deed, logic and experience may limit Sniadach and its progeny to
the retail installment area.
At any rate, one thing is very clear: the questions surrounding
the use of the summary creditor remedy will be with our courts
and legislatures for some time to come.
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252. See Logullo v. Security Pacific National Bank, No. 72-4125 (S.D.
Cal. Oct. 2, 1972).
253. There are UCC provisions aside from Sections 9-503 and 9-504
which could be challenged under the Sniadach trend's rationale. Specific-
ally, see Sections 2-507 (2) (effect of the seller's tender of goods); 2-702
(seller's remedies on discovery of a buyer's insolvency); 2-703 (a) (seller's
remedies in general) and 2-706 (seller's right to resell goods). Also note
UCC Section 2-716 which specifically states that a buyer has a right of re-
plevin on certain terms and conditions.
